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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NFAC #8219-81/1
21 December 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for AfricaSUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa ☐

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1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. ☐

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2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
15 December 1981 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have
significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. ☐

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Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 38

WEST AFRICA

At the request of the NIO, a representative of DIA led a brief discussion of the situation in West Africa. Analysts agreed that future stability of the area would depend on the economic decisions taken by the leaders and on the ability of the present generation of leaders to transfer power to a successor generation without creating political conflict that would lead to military intervention. For the immediate future, the primary external forces affecting the West African states will be France, Libya and the Soviet Union. ☐ 25X1

SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA

By its recent raids into Angola, South Africa has demonstrated that it will let nothing stand in the way of its security needs as it perceives them. As a result of the August South African raid into Angola, Cuban troop strength has been augmented. Analysts felt that the economic situation in Angola was becoming constantly more serious and that the MPLA leadership was becoming more and more desperate regarding the chances of any real improvement. This may have led Dos Santos to make a recent appeal to Libya for arms and economic help. ☐ 25X1

As the prospect of settlement in Namibia becomes better, analysts felt that the Soviets will make greater effort to disrupt settlement negotiations. Consequently, Soviet activity may be expected to rise over the coming months throughout southern Africa. It was agreed to hold a separate meeting early in January to discuss the possible actions the Soviets might take. Analysts felt that the internal situation in Mozambique was becoming more serious. Reports indicate that Zimbabwean forces were involved last month with FPLA troops against the NRM. The fact that Zimbabwe was being asked by the Mozambique government to aid in these operations against the NRM indicates that internal Mozambican insurgency may be becoming a matter of regional concern. ☐ 25X1

SEYCHELLES

Analysts pointed out the potential for greater embarrassment for the US over the next three months because of South African failure to deal severely

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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with those involved in the attempted overthrow of the Rene government. The attempted coup has presented Libya with a greater opportunity to assist Rene with arms and economic help over the next three months. ☐ 25X1

UGANDA

The possibility of an attempted overthrow of the Obote government by Acholi or other internal insurgent groups increases with the projected departure late in December of the 1,000 Tanzanian troops now in Uganda. ☐ 25X1

CHAD

The refusal of the peacekeeping force to become involved in internal Chadian disputes means that the situation in Chad may break down into renewed factional fighting. The key to continued strife in Chad lies in the attempts by Habre to expand his area of control in eastern Chad. It is possible that OAU forces will not be able to get to the areas of factional tension on time or to remain there long enough since they have financing only for the next 2-3 months. If Goukouni is successful in bringing Ethiopian troops to Chad as part of the peacekeeping force, this would, in the analysts view, be the equivalent of a return of Libyan forces and might possibly bring about the withdrawal of the participating Libyan forces. The Chadian situation requires a close watch over the next three months. ☐ 25X1

MADAGASCAR

Analysts reported that there was a strong possibility of complete financial collapse in Madagascar within the next few months leading to urban and rural unrest and student riots. Such disorders could in turn lead to greater Soviet intervention. ☐ 25X1

ZAIRE

Analysts emphasized the continued deterioration of the internal economic situation. There are reports of growing FLNC strength and of a 30-90 day timetable for possible FLNC action in Shaba. A close watch should be kept on the Zaire situation over the next three months, particularly in light of the departure of some of the best units of the Zaire army for Chad. Mobutu may ask for greater U.S. assistance if the Shaba situation becomes more serious in return for the favor of contributing his troops to the Chad peacekeeping force. ☐ 25X1

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